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Global Justice: An Anti-Collectivist and Pro-Causal Ethic
Abstract
Both philosophical and practical analyses of global justice issues have been vitiated by two errors: a too-high
emphasis on the supposed duties of collectives to act, and a too-low emphasis on the analysis of causes and
risks. Concentrating instead on the duties of individual actors and analysing what they can really achieve
reconfigures the field. It diverts attention from individual problems such as poverty or refugees or questions
on what states should do. Instead it shows that there are different duties for political leaders, intelligence
operatives, opinion leaders and citizens in devising, urging and implementing such plans as transfers of aid
with accountability, military interventions in rogue states and limited intakes of refugees. With collectivist
excuses for inaction such as sovereignty out of the way, it is possible to take a cautiously optimistic view of the
possibility of forceful and morally responsible interventions in the range of major global problems.
This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/
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Global Justice: An Anti-Collectivist and Pro-Causal Ethic 
 
James Franklin 
 
 
The most wretched of the earth – those threatened with genocide, inhabitants of dictators’ torture 
chambers, child slaves, desperate refugees, the poorest subsistence farmers and slum dwellers, 
the sick without access to medical care and pharmaceuticals – are typically the victims of the 
failed human systems into which they had the misfortune to be born. Individual action by 
themselves or by others can do little to relieve their burden, but collective action by the more 
fortunate could. Prima facie, they have a right to demand action from the “world community” 
and its agents.1 
 
That right, however, would require the existence of a collective duty or distributed responsibility, 
a notion very far from clear. Only individuals can make decisions and act on them.2 If a 
collective duty does exist, which individual persons are required to act, and in what way? As 
Onora O’Neill points out, lack of focus on the duties imposed on individuals by the supposed 
rights of others has bedevilled discussion for half a century, leading to “the emergence of the 
free-floating rhetoric of rights that now dominates much discussion of justice, focuses on 
recipience, and blandly overlooks the need for a robust and realistic account of agents of justice 
who are to carry the counterpart obligations.”3 That diagnosis is largely correct of high-profile 
projects like Live8, with its demands for intergovernmental aid and debt cancellation.4 It is also a 
tendency, at least, in the language of Declarations of Rights, whose “abstract cosmopolitanism”, 
O’Neill says, “has practical import only when we can determine who ought to do what for 
whom.”5 It applies also to the way questions of global justice are posed by such leading 
philosophers as Peter Singer, who assumes that giving to large aid organisations is the main duty 
of the rich,6 and Thomas Pogge, who concentrates on the collective responsibility of the rich for 
unjust global political and economic structures.7 
 
The contention of this article is that discussion of global justice has been vitiated by a lack of 
attention to two related matters: firstly, the individual as opposed to collective nature of 
                                                 
1
 Justifications of a duty to assist the world poor from various ethical positions in Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, 
1967, n.3, 17, 22, 44-45;  J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1999, especially ch. 15, 
and the works of Singer and Pogge, below nn. 5-6. 
2
 Despite the legal usefulness of corporate responsibility; defence in J.R. Welch, ‘Corporate Agency and Reduction’, 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 39, 1989, pp. 409-24. 
3
 Onora O’Neill, ‘Agents of Justice’, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 22, 2001, pp. 180-195, at p. 186. 
4
 Live 8, Accessed: http://www.live8live.com [15/4/2011] 
5
 O’Neill, ‘Global justice: whose obligations?’, in D. K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the 
Distant Needy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 242-59, at p. 245. 
6
 P. Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd edition), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, ch. 8; P. Singer, The Life 
You Can Save: Acting Now To End World Poverty, Random House, New York, 2009. 
7
 T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002 
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responsibilities, and secondly, causality and risk. The two are related in that inattention to how 
causes work naturally goes together with inattention to how any person can bring about the 
changes supposedly implied by a collective responsibility. It is argued that examination of these 
two would result in recommendations different from the usual ones as to action to implement the 
rights of the most oppressed citizens of the globe. 
 
The thread that runs through cases of obligation on individuals to respond to other people’s 
crises is causal effect, or more exactly the reasonable probability of having a beneficial causal 
effect. 
 
If I see someone fall in the river, it is my responsibility to help him if he appears to need it. That 
is just because he is another human being in extreme need and I have the ability to save him. His 
right to be saved and my duty to save him follow from his need and my ability. I may be excused 
if I don’t know about it, or if I can’t swim, or if there is someone nearby with a better chance of 
saving him who is willing to try. Those considerations are relevant because they concern the 
causal connections between myself and saving the victim. But I am not excused on the basis of 
my not having been elected to the office of lifesaver, or by my having other things I would prefer 
to be doing, or by my being of a different race from the victim. Nor on the basis that the victim 
fell into the river from the other bank, which is in another sovereign state (unless that results in 
some relevant causal circumstance, such as the presence of trigger-happy border guards). 
 
What if someone falls in the river and is observed by two potential rescuers, both with the 
ability, but possibly an unequal ability, to effect the rescue? The obligation is distributed, in the 
sense that someone must act – ideally the person with the greater ability, but the other must back 
up as needed, either by assisting or by taking on the burden if the other drops it. To establish who 
does what, there is an obligation to conduct negotiations (possibly tacit and quick, if the urgency 
of the situation demands it) to decide who is the one to jump in. 
 
If there are a hundred people on the bank, the obligation is more distributed still. A member of 
the group of average ability might well hang back and see if any hero selects himself for the job. 
But if not, some responsibility devolves on anyone who has the ability to take useful action. 
 
If there is a group of people on the bank already partly organised into a society, for example a 
busload of army recruits under a sergeant, the holder of authority has a special responsibility to 
evaluate whether the group should turn aside from what it is doing and organise the rescue. Since 
authority is normally not absolute but depends on the cooperation of the governed, the 
individuals in the group have a duty to cooperate with a good decision by the authority figure (if 
allowed, vote for it), and protest against a bad one. 
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If the falling of people into the river becomes a predictable event – perhaps people are jumping 
or being thrown in the river to take advantage of the rescuers’ previously exhibited good nature – 
a different style of response becomes necessary. The same people who would have responsibility 
in a one-off case have a similar responsibility to inquire into the causes of the continual fallings 
into the river, and to prevent them recurring if that is reasonably possible with available 
resources. Since inquiry and prevention are very time-consuming, however, and they have other 
things to do for which they have more talent, they will prefer to delegate those tasks if possible 
to experts empowered and paid to act on their behalf. That will adequately limit the tendency of 
the “duty to rescue” to ramify indefinitely into neverending obligations that make ordinary life 
impossible.8 
 
These considerations suggest several lines of attack on the problem of severe world poverty and 
oppression. On the one hand, there is such a thing as the “right of humanitarian intervention” 
agreed to by the European Parliament.9 The most desperate in the world have a right to be 
helped, and those who can do something have a duty to do it. On the other hand, collectivist 
platitudes about the rights or duties of states or organisations of states will not in themselves 
reveal who ought to do what. There must be serious analysis of causes, risks and possibilities 
before the duties of any particular actor become clear. A collectivist question such as “does a 
country have a moral obligation to admit refugees, or give aid to poor nations?”, as has often 
been asked,10 is too blunt, as well as concentrating attention without argument on one particular 
form of possible action. 
 
It is especially the matter of risk analysis – causality again, since it deals with the probability of 
causes and effects – that requires the problem to be posed in greater generality than that of 
compartmentalized questions of “rights of refugees” or “rights of poor countries to aid”. Those 
restrictions of perspective divert attention from proper inquiry into the possible range of actions 
that might relieve the distress of the worst off, and can make it seem obvious that a certain kind 
of action is the right one, when it is not obvious. If one is scandalised about the gross inequality 
in wealth between the world’s rich and poor – say, to be specific, about the inequality between 
two countries with similar natural endowments such as Bangladesh and the Netherlands – then 
there are three initial directions in which one may think of taking action. One approach finds it 
natural to suggest that the Dutch should give the Bangladeshis money.11 A second finds it 
obvious that the border between the two should be abolished – that is, free transit be allowed.12 
Another approach finds it equally cogent to maintain that the Bangladeshis should be forced to 
                                                 
8
 M.A. Menlowe, ‘The philosophical foundations of a duty to rescue’, in M.A. Menlowe & A. McCall Smith (eds.) 
The Duty to Rescue: The Jurisprudence of Aid Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1993. 
9
 V. Zanetti, ‘Global justice: is interventionism desirable?’, Metaphilosophy, Vol.32, 2003, pp.196-211. 
10
 E.g. J.H. Carens, ‘Refugees and the limits of obligation’, Public Affairs Quarterly, 1992, Vol.6, pp. 31-44. 
11
 The approach of Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, and Singer, Practical Ethics, Ch. 4. 
12
 J.H. Carens, ‘Open borders and liberal limits: A response to Isbister’, International Migration Review Vol. 34, 
2000, pp. 636-43. 
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reform their political and economic institutions so they can become as rich as the Dutch.13 Those 
plans are not mutually exclusive, but it is likely that an emphasis on one or the other should arise 
from one’s analysis of the causes of the inequality. That is proper, and moral discussion ought to 
await some adequate knowledge of the causes – at the very least, enough to ensure a reasonable 
probability that the actions one proposes to take will not make the situation worse. Since 
questions of economics, political theory and their interaction are very complex, a certain 
wariness in making moral pronouncements is called for. 
 
The hazards of any simple policy of having rich nations give money to the poor ones are made 
clear by the well-established “curse of natural resources”: being well-endowed with natural 
resources such as oil has proved very often counter-productive for the economies of the countries 
owning them.14 It is debated whether this may be due to economic causes such as the resources 
drawing money from production, or from political causes such as the ruling elites’ use of the 
profits to prop up their power and oppress the citizens. In any case, the simple transfer of 
resources from rich countries to poor without accountability is not a morally acceptable policy 
without a good deal more argument on causes and effects. Transfer of resources with 
accountability is certainly possible, but it requires an attenuation of the sovereignty of the 
receiving nation and hence is a move towards the third option above, that of enforced reform. 
 
A decision to abolish borders or at least make them more porous by admitting refugees is one 
that can only be taken or not by a whole country. There will then be conflicts between different 
interests within the receiving country, and it may be that not everyone has the same moral 
obligation with respect to the decision. Different citizens have not only different abilities to 
cause any change of policy but different exposures to the effects. For example, high-minded 
legislators are unlikely to have to live next to the refugees they decide to admit, to compete with 
them for jobs, or to bear the effects of possible crime and ethnic tensions that may result from 
admitting large numbers of refugees. Further, those risks are hard to predict, even by the 
standards of social engineering in general.15 The poor in a rich country might therefore 
reasonably take a less positive view of their obligations to refugees, so that the concept of an 
obligation on a whole country may be inapplicable. Instead, those with an actual though partial 
ability to influence events, such as politicians, bureaucrats, newspaper columnists and others, 
need to consider how far they can move outcomes in a humanitarian direction, given also the 
risks of doing so (such as political defeat in the short term and its attendant powerlessness to do 
any other good, and troubles such as ethnic tensions in the longer term). 
                                                 
13
 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, especially sections VI and VII, 2002, Accessed: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [15/4/2011]; “softer” versions in A. Sen,  Development as Freedom, 
Knopf, New York, Chs.. 4, 9; H de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, Bantam, London, 2000. 
14
 J.D. Sachs, & A.M. Warner, ‘The curse of natural resources’, European Economic Review, Vol. 45, 2001, pp. 
827-38. 
15
 Emphasised in M.J. Gibney, ‘Liberal democratic states and responsibilities to refugees’, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 93, 1999, pp. 169-81. 
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The risks of accepting large numbers of refugees also need to be balanced against the risk of 
intervening to stem the refugee flow at its source, whatever that might entail in the 
circumstances. Intervention may help the oppressed who would otherwise be tomorrow’s 
refugees, while merely admitting today’s refugees would not. That brings us to the third 
suggested strategy, forceful intervention in foreign countries to rid them of the causes that 
threaten the lives of their citizens. Those causes could be dictators, but could just as well be 
diseases, natural disasters or chronic lack or theft of resources. The more vigorous the proposed 
intervention, the harder to evaluate the risk. The risk that armed intervention in a failed or rogue 
state will lead to a quagmire has to be taken seriously, especially as experience shows foreign 
intervention is often fiercely resisted simply because it is foreign.16 But the risk also needs to be 
balanced (approximate numbers would help) against the risk of leaving the failed state as it is, 
with its possibilities of proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, or natural plagues arising 
far from the reach of Western medical science.  
 
Having posed the moral question as one for individuals and urged that necessary risk analyses be 
undertaken, one must ask the causal question: what can one person do, even a powerful one? 
Here, there is cause for optimism in that human societies structure themselves in such a way that 
major decisions are passed to small groups of people. Otherwise, major initiatives would never 
get under way, but plainly they do. It is less clear that this can happen at an international level, 
especially in cases where the interests to be served are those of the world’s powerless such as the 
poor or refugees, but there are enough successful cases to suggest more is possible than would 
initially appear from concentrating on the biased sample of festering remnants of failed attempts. 
 
In view of the salience of cases where the international community has failed to act, such as the 
Rwandan and Sudanese genocides, global warming and malaria, it must be emphasised that there 
are many other instances of intense and effective large-scale international cooperation, even in 
peacetime. Classic nineteenth-century cases include the Universal Postal Union and the 
suppression of the slave trade through internationally agreed direct action on the high seas.17 In 
the twentieth century, the refugee crises posed by the million anti-Communist “Displaced 
Persons” left in Western Europe in 1945 and by the Vietnamese boat people of the late 1970s 
were solved quickly and efficiently; various diplomatic efforts by the most powerful Western 
governments relieved the intolerable pressure on the countries of first asylum by arranging 
resettlement in distant lands, without consultation with the (ethnically different) citizens of those 
countries.18 There are very powerful international compliance regimes to guard against major 
                                                 
16
 M.W. Doyle, ‘The new interventionism’, Metaphilosophy, Vol.32, 2001, pp. 212-235. 
17
 G. Codding, The Universal Postal Union, Coordinator of the International Mails, New York University Press, 
New York, 1964; P.M. Kielstra, The Politics of Slave Trade Suppression in Britain and France, 1814-1848, St 
Martin’s Press, New York, 2000. 
18
 M. Wyman, DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-1951, Balch Institute Press, Philadelphia, 1988 ; B. Wain,  
The Refused: The Agony of the Indochinese Refugees, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1981, Ch. 11. 
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transnational risks such as epidemics, computer incidents and banking defaults.19 The 
international community, or at least a coalition of its most powerful members, can act decisively 
if motivation is present. With the end of the international political stalemates of the Cold War 
era, international problems should be easier to solve. The excuse that international cooperation to 
solve global problems is impossible has no merit – effective cooperation was achieved, and the 
will of individuals caused it. 
 
The possibility and actuality of world-scale action call in question collectivist excuses as to why 
it should not be undertaken, especially the excuse from sovereignty. In earlier times, when cross-
border action was largely unfeasible, sovereignty was to some extent necessary by default, but in 
the era of globalization (and precisely targeted air power), with intricate causal networks linking 
all communities, its justification needs re-evaluation. Sovereignty, in the sense of the right of a 
state to pursue its internal affairs free of interference from other states, has two natural 
justifications, which must be kept separate in order to determine when one or the other may be 
overriden. The first applies where the citizens of a functioning state are part of a genuine 
community. Like a voluntary corporation such as a company or monastery, such a state acquires 
a presumptive right to be left alone to pursue its business, a right that is the sum of the rights of 
the individuals in it to pursue their lawful affairs. That moral justification of sovereignty does not 
apply to cases of failed states and kleptocracies in which the state apparatus deliberately acts 
against the interests of its own “citizens”. Even less does it apply to weak states whose writ does 
not run in much of the geographical area allotted to them on world maps. 
 
The other justification for sovereignty is in terms of causality and risk, or perhaps more exactly 
game theory. Agreements, explicit or tacit, between states not to invade one another have a 
tendency to reduce wars, so there is a presumption in favour of keeping to those agreements even 
when made with rogue states. A general recognition of sovereignty may be in the general 
interest. That is a substantial justification, and applies in the case of rogue states as much as to 
respectable states. As a justification, it is defeasible, and may be defeated by both moral and 
pragmatic considerations. On the pragmatic side, it may be defeated by a well-substantiated risk 
assessment as to the probability of future wars resulting from leaving rogue states untouched, 
perhaps resulting from invasions by them of neighbouring states or from their collaborating in 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Pragmatic considerations merge into moral 
considerations when we consider who pays the costs of risks that are realised. Turning the blind 
eye of appeasement or “respect for sovereignty” will or may reasonably be assessed to be at 
someone’s expense later, as in the period of “Munich” in 1938. Even before wars between states 
arise, appeasement is likely to be at the expense of ethnic minorities and dissidents inside the 
rogue states, who have a right to put their claims on the table.20 
                                                 
19
 J. Franklin, Operational risk under Basel II: A model for extreme risk evaluation, Banking and Financial Services 
Policy Report Vol. 27, No. 10, 2008, pp. 10-16. 
20
 Generally, A. Cranston, The Sovereignty Revolution, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004. 
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Nor do the moral claims of sovereignty in themselves have force against the claims of refugees, 
for the same reason as the rights of an organised group to be left alone are overridden by the 
claims of someone they see fall in the river – a right to non-interference does not bear on the 
claims of a human being in need. That is the justification for the universalist position on 
migration taken by the Catholic Church. Pius XII, speaking of the many postwar refugees in 
Europe in 1948, said: 
 
The natural law itself, no less than devotion to humanity, urges that ways of migration be 
opened to these people. For the Creator of the universe made all good things primarily for 
the good of all. Since land everywhere offers the possibility of supporting a large number 
of people, the sovereignty of the State, although it must be respected, cannot be 
exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, 
denied to needy or decent people from other nations, provided of course, that the public 
wealth, considered very carefully, does not forbid this.21  
 
Justifications for excluding refugees will need to invoke instead considerations of risk. Such 
considerations may well be available. The Palestinians in the 1930s and 1940s faced genuine 
risks from the immigration of an ethnically incompatible tide of refugees with no intention of 
assimilating. There are less extreme cases. It may be foreseeable that refugees will form ghettos 
that will breed a minority of extremists who will demand a theocratic state incompatible with the 
liberal host state’s values.22 Or it may be foreseeable that admitting refugees who have 
completed dangerous clandestine journeys to seek asylum will encourage more dangerous 
journeys and deaths. To use these risks as an excuse for inaction would be callous, but the host 
state under pressure might well be motivated to courses of action other than simple admission of 
large numbers of refugees. That might include encouraging the world community or its more 
active members to take action at source on the problem causing the refugee outflow, or forcing 
or paying other states to take a fair share of refugees. Those courses of action erode the 
sovereignty of the target nations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
If an actor with some political power decides to do something on behalf of those in severe 
poverty in another state, what obligations does he have to inform his own citizens? In a 
democratic polity in particular, electors may be sceptical of the benefits of high-minded gestures 
for non-citizens, and there may by electoral pain for the actor – possibly enough to prevent the 
proposed action coming to fruition. If refugees are to be accepted, should he inform his own 
xenophobic citizens about it as little as possible, for example by being vague about the likely 
number of arrivals and by emphasising the economic benefits of cheap labour? If a dictator is to 
be overthrown, and the citizens of the nation providing the troops have little interest in the 
                                                 
21
 Pius XII to Cardinal McNicholas, 24/12/48, quoted in G. Tessarolo (ed.), The Church’s Magna Charta for 
Migrants, St Charles Seminary, Staten Island, NY, 1962, p. 51. 
22
 Discussion in M. Weiner, ‘Ethics, national sovereignty and the control of immigration’, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 30, 1996, pp. 171-197. 
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victims who are being tortured in the dictator's gaols, should intelligence reports of his weapons 
of mass destruction be “sexed up” to fill the propaganda gap? If the extreme poor of a 
neighbouring country need to be helped, should the economic benefits of doing so be 
exaggerated? 
 
These special difficulties of extracting action from a democracy for the benefit of anyone but its 
own voters raise the question of whether there is any application of the notion of “reason of 
state”, although that notion was originally developed with reference to absolute monarchies. Jean 
de Silhon, theorist to Cardinal Richelieu, argued that actions not normally licit, like lying, might 
be justified in political affairs by “reason of state” (“a mean between that which conscience 
permits and affairs require”).23 It is all very well for the Prince to keep to exalted moral 
principles like keeping his word, but ought he do so when the safety of his subjects is at stake? 
An individual only risks his own when he voluntarily suffers loss in order to do noble deeds, but 
for princes or their ministers to do the same is not noble but imprudent. “They are unjust if they 
sacrifice that which is not theirs and has been placed in their hands as a sacred trust.”24 The 
dilemma is serious for a politician, bureaucrat or intelligence operative in a democracy, who 
believes that overall regime change in another country is imperative but is in possession of a fact 
that if revealed would make intervention politically impossible. His duty to the victims of the 
evil regime hoping for deliverance are serious, and has the potential to outweigh his obligations 
to be honest in his pronouncements. When all due discounting has been done for the long-term 
effects of getting involved in murky business, the urgent claims of victims not to be sacrificed 
for bureaucratic high-minded clean-handedness remain. An absolutist clean-hands doctrine 
would wrongly assign responsibility for the effects of what we do but not for the effects of what 
we fail to do.25 The conflict has the inevitability, even tragedy, of the conflict between justice 
and mercy. Both sides of the equation have force: the abstract principles and the need for 
consistency and long-term trustworthiness on one hand, and the special demands – equally 
matters of ethical principle – of particular human cases on the other. 
 
Although it is not the business of a philosophical article to make detailed policy prescriptions, a 
small sample of possible recommendations is useful to illustrate what the present anti-collectivist 
and pro-causal perspective would mean in practice, and how it differs from classical attempts to 
help the world poor through untied intergovernmental aid, debt cancellation and the admission of 
refugees. Those policies, though necessary at times, are too easily manipulated in such a way as 
                                                 
23
 J. De Silhon, ‘Lettre à l’Evesque de Nantes’, quoted in W.F. Church,  Richelieu and Reason of State, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1973, p. 168. 
24
 J. De Silhon, Le Ministre d'Estat, Paris, 1631 pp. 99-100, quoted in Church, pp. 263-4. 
25
 S. Uniacke, ‘Absolutely clean hands? Responsibility for what’s allowed in refraining from what’s not allowed’, 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 7, 1999, pp. 189-209. 
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to entrench or spread problems instead of solving them,26 as well as erring by thinking of states 
as actors instead of looking at obligations of and effects on individuals. 
 
The following suggestions urge action on certain agents of “the world community”. That is not to 
be interpreted in the vague collectivist sense that the phrase often has, but on the model of the 
kind of successful international bodies mentioned earlier that deal with global risks, such as the 
World Health Organization’s Global Outbreak and Response Network and the Bank of 
International Settlement’s Basel II risk compliance regime for banks.27 In these cases the risks 
have been sufficient for nations to devolve sovereignty (on particular matters) to international 
committees of experts and for individuals in most countries to obey their directives. The 
successful experience in these comparatively technical fields simply needs to be repeated more 
widely. 
 
The suggestions are: 
 
• A permanent and well-equipped rapid response force under the command of the world 
community. That would enable direct causal action aimed at the worst of the worst problems. 
It would consist not of contingents sent by states but of volunteers on the model of the old 
French Foreign Legion. Casualties among those “expendables” – some might say 
mercenaries, but guardians of freedom might be a more appropriate name – would not have 
the same depressive effect on public opinion in democracies as casualties in their own armies 
have. The issue of who should decide on its deployment is a difficult one – the United 
Nations seems inadequate, given its record in Rwanda and Srebrenica, while it would be 
equally inappropriate for the force to be effectively at the disposal of a single superpower. 
There are the usual difficulties of knowing whether a war will make things better or worse. 
Nevertheless the existence of such a force would give pause to those who believe they can 
create terror or tyranny with impunity in remote regions. 
 
• A strengthening of direct interventions by the world community in the economic, security and 
legal affairs of the poorest countries, such as World Bank restructurings of failed economies. 
Whatever the difficulties of such plans, as to both implementation and knowledge of the 
effects, they have a direct causal action towards affording a basic level of accountability that 
is lacking in aid shipments to dictators purporting to act on behalf of their citizens. The 
representatives of the world community will need to consult local citizens more thoroughly 
than was customary in colonial times, but the world community’s proconsul in such a state 
will also need to be able to call on military and police assistance from outside if necessary, to 
counter physical threats to himself and his staff and denials of access by them to problem 
                                                 
26
 D. Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, New York, 2004. 
27
 Accessed: http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/ ; http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm [15/4/2011] 
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areas. Such interventions will also need to be more generously funded than has been the case, 
or a “restructured” economy will fall apart at great cost to the worst off. The world 
community’s representatives will also have responsibility for holding large foreign firms to 
high standards in, for example, industrial safety. All such aid projects will need to pass 
higher standards of accountability than in the past.28 
 
• A pharmaceutical treaty to improve the supply of drugs to the Third World. Negotiations 
must cover a co-ordinated approach to the issues of the supply of generic drugs at low prices, 
action against their re-export to rich countries, and subsidies for research and development on 
tropical diseases such as malaria. Like Saddam Hussein, the malarial mosquito has tortured 
thousands who could do nothing to free themselves by their own efforts and a high-tech 
offensive can rescue them (with fewer collateral casualties than in the Iraqi case). 
 
• Improvement in the conditions in refugee camps, paid for by the world community. Refugees 
are among the most disadvantaged of all people, and direct action to assist them is easy and 
easily known to be effective. When camp conditions are persistent, camps should be supplied 
with not only food and shelter, but IT and education facilities such as books in English, to 
enable the expansions of the mental horizons of, especially, the younger generation. 
 
• A world vote for the agency or agencies with carriage of the above initiatives. A complete 
world parliament may not be necessary or desirable, but the experience of poor regions in 
Europe shows that having a vote for a distant supranational parliament is worth something in 
motivating central administrators to action. It creates a causal link between what people think 
they need and what actions are taken by leaders. The experience of the United Nations shows 
how not being subject to popular vote undermines both actions and legitimacy. 
 
• A refocussing of Western military spending towards surveillance and smart weaponry and 
away from heavy hardware. Contrary to earlier moral assumptions, much of the huge military 
research budgets of the late twentieth century proved in retrospect to have been money well 
spent. They not only ensured for the West the clear superiority that allowed it to prevail 
bloodlessly in the Cold War, but gave it by the end of the century surveillance capabilities 
through satellite imagery and signals intelligence that may render nation-scale violence 
obsolete, in the way that cannon rendered robber barons obsolete. More of such 
comparatively cheap and widely applicable research is needed, rendering the need for heavy 
weaponry less. Complementary action against landmines and the arms trade to Third World 
states is needed. 
 
• A strengthening of the International Court of Justice and its investigations of crimes against 
humanity. As is the case within states, the prospect of justice being done at some time in the 
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future has the potential to discourage crimes in the present. More legal coordination to allow 
cross-border compensation cases would also cause those who, for example, operate unsafe 
factories in third world countries to face legal effects in their own countries.29 
 
On the propaganda front, an emphasis on the excitement of clearing up world poverty and 
injustice instead of a diet of pure appeals to compassion. The race to the moon and most medical 
research have been inspired by a positive will to win. A role model more gung-ho in style than 
Mother Teresa would be desirable. 
 
Since urging action on the “world community” is as collectivist in tone as urging it on individual 
states, if not more so, and since bodies acting on behalf of the world community do not grow 
spontaneously, we must return to the question of which individuals are obliged to take which 
actions. If there is a civil war or natural disaster in a poor state with atrocities reported daily, 
which could be stopped by forceful intervention, who may constitute himself sheriff if the self-
declared representatives of the world community, such as the UN Security Council, the African 
Union or similar bodies are doing nothing? The situation is as in the American Old West. If there 
is a moderately functioning authority, it has priority and everyone must cooperate with it, in 
return for which it must accept responsibility to do its best with all the demands placed on it; if 
there is no such authority, the oppressed will have to take their chances with whatever gunslinger 
will accept the sheriff’s star. 
 
Bureaucrats and negotiators need to keep a realistic view of the constraints they are acting under, 
but at the same time not use citizens’ or politicians’ apathy as an excuse for doing nothing 
themselves. Since there have been many cases of positive change of policy, some optimism is 
justified, and the wide professional knowledge of bureaucrats puts them in special position to 
initiate change. 
 
Philosophers and other intellectuals are not at the frontline of action or of decisions about action. 
They do have some role in the formation of public opinion, especially in the longer term. They 
have a responsibility to conduct at least an initial causal analysis on the likely effects of actions, 
and the real possibility of actions being taken, before they make moral pronouncements on what 
collectives such as states or the United Nations ought or ought not do. In considering possible 
decisions for armed intervention, for example, their analyses should at the very least mention the 
victims of both intervention (such as casualties) and non-intervention (such as those tortured by 
existing regimes), and they should attempt a rough count of each. Analyses of the motivations of 
regimes intervening and regimes being intervened against should allude to what those regimes 
actually say about their own motivations. Analyses of risks should consider both short and long 
timescales, so that, for example, the risk of stirring up terrorism in the short term by intervention 
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is set against the risk of strengthening evil regimes by a long-term policy of appeasement. As 
with body counts, risks should be approximately quantified, so that merely humanistic qualitative 
talk does not spuriously balance remote possibilities against substantial risks. Intellectuals should 
not make moral pronouncements on globalization without extensive reading in economics. 
 
Calls for action by collectives, or calls for inaction pending decisions by collectives, can appear 
to assuage intellectuals’ guilt about their irrelevance. What will actually help the earth’s poorest 
is careful analysis of what individuals can carry out what actions, with what effects and with 
what risks. 
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